Garnett and Thompson: LLC and LLP Losses No Longer Passive Per Se by Thomas, Jonathan W.
GARNETT AND THOMPSON: LLC AND LLP LOSSES
No LONGER PASSIVE PER SE
JONATHAN W. THOMAS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Seemingly perpetual net operating losses. Less personal income.
Same personal tax liability for business entities taxed as partnerships under
Federal law. Proposed higher marginal tax rates. These factors over the
past 18-24 months have led to uncertainty in the United States economy and
stymied both investment and the creation of new businesses. Two recent
decisions, Garnett v. Commissioner' (Garnett) and Thompson v. United
States of America2 (Thompson) offer potential economic relief to taxpayers
that hold interests in limited liability companies (LLCs) and limited liability
partnerships (LLPs). The United States Tax Court's and the United States
Court of Federal Claims' decisions in these two cases will now make it
easier for taxpayers to demonstrate they are "material participants" in their
respective LLCs and LLPs. Since it will now be easier for taxpayers to
demonstrate their material participation, they will potentially be able to
offset their ordinary income with losses from their interests in LLCs and
LLPs rather than only being permitted to use those losses to offset their
passive activity income or having to carry them over to the next taxable
year as passive activity credits under I.R.C. § 469. At a time when many
LLCs and LLPs are generating net operating losses instead of profits, the
ability of taxpayers to deduct their pro rata share of those losses from their
ordinary income means they could see a reduction in their tax liability and
LLCs and LLPs may become an attractive investment tool.
In addition to this introductory section, this note will contain four
additional sections. In Section II, four topics will be discussed: (1) the
history, legislative intent and effect of I.R.C. § 469(h)(2) on limited
partnerships; (2) the creation of LLCs and their tax treatment as
partnerships by the IRS; (3) why the IRS believes that interests held in
LLCs are limited partnership interests and (4) how the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon's decision in Gregg v. US.3 set
forth the legal and analytical framework for the decisions rendered in
Juris Doctor, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, expected 2011.
See generally Garnett v. Comm'r, 132 T.C. No. 19 (2009).
2 See generally Thompson v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 728 (Fed. Cl. 2009).
3 Gregg v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1125 (D. Or. 2000).
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Garnett and Thompson. In Section III, the analysis of the United States Tax
Court's decision in Garnett will be discussed. In Section IV, the analysis of
the United States Court of Federal Claims' decision in Thompson will be
discussed. Section V will conclude this note with a discussion of how
Garnett has already yielded a positive result for taxpayers in the United
States Tax Court's decision in Hegarty v. Commissione 4 and how the legal
analysis set forth in both Garnett and Thompson might have an unintended
consequence for taxpayers with respect to I.R.C. § 1402 self-employment
taxes.
II. I.R.C. § 469: ERADICATION OF TAX-SHELTERS
Section 469 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) disallows certain
taxpayers from offsetting their ordinary income with losses or credits from
their passive activities.5 Passive activities are further defined as ". . . any
activity in which the taxpayer does not materially participate."6 A taxpayer
is considered to materially participate in any activity in which they
participate on a "regular, continuous and substantial basis."7 Section 469 of
the IRC was enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA).' Prior
to the enactment of the TRA, there was generally no limitation on the
ability of taxpayers to use deductions from one or more activities to offset
income derived from other activities.9 Congress and the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) considered this tax-shelter practice as the underlying reason
taxpayers were losing faith in the federal income tax system and creating a
prolific expansion of tax shelters.'o To restore faith in the federal income
tax system and limit tax shelters, Congress viewed § 469 as a way of
making it more difficult for passive investors to use losses from their
passive activities to offset their ordinary income:
4 Hegarty v. Comm'r, No. 3730-07S, 2009 Tax Ct. LEXIS 154, at *8 (T.C. Oct.
6, 2009).
' I.R.C. § 469(a)(1) (West 2009). "If for any taxable year, the taxpayer is a
person described in paragraph (2), neither --- (A) the passive activity loss, nor
(B) the passive activity credit, for the taxable year shall be allowed." Id. "The
following persons are described in this paragraph: (A) any individual, estate or
trust, (B) any closely held C corporation, and (C) any personal service
corporation." I.R.C. § 469(a)(2).
6 I.R.C. § 469(c)(1). The term 'passive activity' means any activity - (A) which
involves the conduct of any trade or business, and (B) in which the taxpayer does
not materially participate. I.R.C. § 469(c)(2).
' I.R.C. § 469 (h)(1). "A taxpayer shall be treated as materially participating in
an activity only if the taxpayer is involved in the operations of the activity on a
basis which is - (A) regular, (B) continuous and (C) substantial." Id.
8 STAFF ON J. COmm. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 209 (1987).
9 Id.
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In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that
taxpayers are losing faith in the federal income tax system.
This loss of confidence has resulted in large part from ...
the opportunities it provides for taxpayers to offset income
from one source with tax shelter deductions and credits
from another . . . The prevalence of tax shelters in recent
years has been well documented . . .. Such patterns give
rise to a number of undesirable consequences, even aside
from their effect in reducing federal tax revenues.
Extensive shelter activity contributes to public concerns
that the tax system is unfair, and to the belief that tax is
paid only by the naive and the unsophisticated. This, in
turn, not only undermines compliance, but encourages
further expansion of the tax shelter market, in many cases
diverting investment capital from productive activities to
those principally or exclusively serving tax avoidance goals
. . . . The committee believes that the most important
sources of support for the federal income tax system are the
average citizens who simply report their income (typically
consisting predominantly of items such as salaries, wages,
pensions, interest, and dividends) and pay tax under the
general rules. To the extent that these citizens feel that
they are bearing a disproportionate burden with regard to
the costs of government because of their unwillingness or
inability to engage in tax-oriented investment activity, the
tax system itself is threatened . . . . Under these
circumstances, the committee believes that decisive action
is needed to curb the expansion of tax sheltering and to
restore to the tax system the degree of equity that is a
necessary precondition to a beneficial and widely desired
reduction in rates. So long as tax shelters are permitted to
erode the federal tax base, a low-rate system can provide
neither sufficient revenues, nor sufficient progressivity, to
satisfy the general public that tax liability bears a fair
relationship to the ability to pay. In particular, a provision
significantly limiting the use of tax shelter losses is
unavoidable if substantial rate reductions are to be provided
to high-income taxpayers without disproportionately
reducing the share of total liability under the individual
income tax that is borne by high-income taxpayers as a
group.1'
" Id. at 211-12.
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A. I.R.C. § 469(h)(2): The Limited Partnership Restriction
The effect of § 469(h)(2) is that any limited partnership interest
held by a limited partner is presumptively treated as an interest in which the
taxpayer is passive and does not materially participate. 12 Like other
taxpayers, limited partners holding a limited partnership interest13 can
demonstrate their material participation in their trade or business by using
the material participation tests set forth in 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1)-(7).14
12 I.R.C. § 469(h)(2): "[e]xcept as provided in regulations, no interest in a limited
partnership as a limited partner shall be treated as an interest with respect to
which a taxpayer materially participates."
13 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(e)(3) (2009) defines a limited partnership interest as:
[A] partnership interest shall be treated as a limited partnership
interest if-- (A) Such interest is designated a limited
partnership interest in the limited partnership agreement or the
certificate of limited partnership, without regard to whether the
liability of the holder of such interest for obligations of the
partnership is limited under the applicable State law; or (B)
The liability of the holder of such interest for obligations of the
partnership is limited, under the law of the State in which the
partnership is organized, to a determinable fixed amount (for
example, the sum of the holder's capital contributions to the
partnership and contractual obligations to make additional
capital contributions to the partnership).
Id.
14 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a).
Except as provided in paragraphs (e) and (h)(2) of this section, an
individual shall be treated, for purposes of section 469 and the
regulations thereunder, as materially participating in an activity for
the taxable year if and only if-
(1) The individual participates in the activity for more than 500
hours during such year;
(2) The individual's participation in the activity for the taxable
year constitutes substantially all of the participation in such
activity for all individuals, (including individuals who are not
owners of interests in the activity), for such taxable year;
(3) The taxpayer participates in the activity for more than 100
hours during the taxable year, and such individual's
participation in the activity for the taxable year is not less than
the participation in the activity of any other individual,
(including individuals who are not owners interests in the
activity) for such taxable year;
(4) The activity is a significant participation activity[ ] for the
taxable year, and the individual's aggregate participation in all
significant participation activities during such taxable year
exceeds 500 hours;
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However, 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(e)(2) works in tandem with § 469(h)(2) by
only allowing limited partners holding a limited partnership interest to
demonstrate they are material participants by using three of the seven tests
set forth in 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a): (1), (5) and (6). These three tests read,
respectively:
(a)(1) The taxpayer participates in the activity for more
than 500 hours during such year.' 5
(a)(5) The taxpayer materially participated in the activity
for any 5 taxable years, whether or not consecutive, during
the 10 taxable years immediately preceding the taxable
year.i1
(a)(6) The activity is a personal service activity and the
taxpayer materially participated in the activity for any 3
taxable years, whether or not consecutive, preceding the
taxable year.1
The language of § 469(h)(2) and 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(e)(2)
reflects Congress' principal concern regarding tax-shelter abuse and the
interrelationship between this practice with limited partnerships. In the
time period leading up the TRA, Congress felt that limited partnerships
were among the most prevalent and widely used tax shelters. Further,
Congress knew that under relevant state laws, limited partners in a limited
partnership lost their limited liability protection if they were materially
active; thus, Congress presumed that limited partners were not material
participants. Therefore, the enactment of § 469(h)(2) accomplished
Congress' intent of limiting tax-shelter abuse in limited partnerships and
restoring trust in the federal tax system: by presumptively characterizing a
limited partner in a limited partnership as being passive instead of
materially active in the partnership, and in disallowing passive activity
(5) The individual materially participated in the activity[ ] for any
5 taxable years, (whether or not consecutive) during the 10
taxable years that immediately preceding the taxable year;
(6) The activity is a personal service activity and the taxpayer
materially participated in the activity for any 3 taxable years,
(whether or not consecutive) preceding the taxable year; or
(7) Based on all of the facts and circumstances, the individual
participates in the activity on a regular, continuous, and
substantial basis during such taxable year.
26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1)-(7).
'" 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1).
16 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(5).
" 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(6).18 STAFF ON J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 8.
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losses to be used in the offsetting of ordinary income, limited partnerships
were no longer a viable entity in tax-shelter abuse.
B. A Brief History: The Limited Liability Company and Federal
Taxation Treatment by the IRS
When the TRA was enacted in 1986, LLPs did not exist and only
one state had a registered LLC.'9 In 1977, the state of Wyoming created the
first limited liability act in the United States.2 o In 1982, the state of Florida
created the second state limited liability company statute in the United
States. 2 1 Despite the attractiveness of LLCs - limited liability protection
for members, the same protection provided to shareholders in a corporation,
and the pass-through taxation feature as opposed to the double-taxation
feature of corporations - only one LLC was registered between 1977 and
1986.22 It is widely believed that the reluctance of states to enact LLC
statutes and taxpayers failure to register them in the states where statutes
were enacted, was due to the uncertainty as to how the IRS would treat
them for taxation purposes: as a corporation, or as a partnership under the
"Kintner Regulations." 23
19 The first LLP was registered in 1991 and in 1986 Wyoming had the only
registered LLC. Garnett, 132 T.C. No. 19 at 12.
20 CORPOR LLC, http://www.corporllc.com/llchistory.html (last visited May 13,
2009).
21 id
22 Garnett, 132 T.C. No. 19 at 12.
23 Steven A Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulations, The Check-The-Box
Election And The Future Of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 402, 426
(1996). The "Kintner Regulations" were promulgated by the IRS in response its
loss in United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). In Kintner, a
physician and his partner were not permitted, by way of state law, to create a
business entity that was a corporation. Nonetheless, they were able to form a
business entity that was a partnership for state law purposes, but qualified as a
corporation for federal tax purposes.
As indicated by Dean, the IRS perceived this a manipulation of the
current tax code because in creating the corporation for federal taxation purposes,
Kintner and his partner were able to take "advantage of tax-favored pension at
the time only available to corporations" and would not be personally liable for
their entity's tax liability. Id. As a result, the IRS promulgated the Kintner
Regulations for the purpose of making it more difficult "for taxpayers to achieve
corporate tax status for unincorporated entities, including partnerships." Id. The
six criteria contained in the Kintner Regulations were:
(1) associates;
(2) an objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom
(3) continuity of life;
(4) centralized management;
(5) liability for corporate debts limited to corporate property and
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From 1977 until 1988, the IRS gave states little guidance as to how
they would treat an LLC for taxation purposes.2 4 Then, in 1988, the IRS
issued Revenue Ruling 88-76,25 which announced its intention to treat the
only LLC registered in the state of Wyoming, and in the United States, as a
partnership rather than a corporation for taxation purposes.
To further facilitate the federal taxation treatment of LLCs as
partnerships and not corporations, the IRS issued Notice 98-11 in 1996,
which went into effect in 1997 as 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7701-1, 301.7701-2 and
301.7701-3, better known as the "check-the-box regulations."26  The
issuance of these "check-the-box" regulations is considered important in the
movement to "simplify tax law" because unlike the "Kintner Regulations,"
it allows taxpayers (with a few exceptions) to determine how their business
entities will classified for federal taxation purposes by simply filing out a
form which contains the requisite "boxes" to "check." 27
(6) free transferability of interests
While there were six criteria listed, the IRS used (3)-(6) as part of its
"preponderance test." Id. at 426-427. Under the "preponderance test," in order
for an unincorporated entity to be classified as a corporation for federal tax
purposes, it must have possessed three of the four aforementioned characteristics;
thus, if it possessed two or less, it was a partnership. Id.
24 Donald A. Frederick, The ABCs of LLCs: Limited Liability Companies Offer
New Option for Rural Businesses, RURAL COOPERATIVES, July/August, at 36,
available at http://www.uwcc.wisc.edu/info/farmer/pre2001/abc.html.
25 d
26 Dean, supra note 23.
27 Id Under I.R.C. § 301.7701-3(a), an "eligible entity," that is, an entity that is
not classified as a corporation under 301.7701-2(b)(2), "can elect its
classification for federal tax purposes." 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(b) lists the
following entities as corporations, and thus ineligible to elect their classification
for taxation purposes:
(1) A business entity organized under a Federal or State statute,
or under a statute of a federally recognized Indian tribe, if the
statute describes or refers to the entity as incorporated or as a
corporation, body corporate, or body politic;
(2) An association (as determined under section 301.7701-3);
(3) A business entity organized under a State statute, if the statute
describes or refers to the entity as a joint-stock company or joint-
stock association;
(4) An insurance company;
(5) A State-chartered business entity conducting banking
activities, if any of its deposits are insured under the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, as amended, 12 U.S.C. 1811 et seq., or a
similar federal statute;
(6) A business entity wholly owned by a State or any political
subdivision thereof,
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C. The IRS' Position on LLCs and LLPs: Section 469(h) (2) Applies
The position of the IRS is that § 469(h)(2) applies to interests held
in LLCs and LLPs, because both of these business entities can be taxed as a
partnership rather than a corporation, under the laws of the state in which
they are registered. 2 8 Further, the IRS considers these interests to be held as
a limited partner in a limited partnership within the meaning of 26 C.F.R. §
1.469-5T(e)(3) because the central feature of being a limited partner in a
limited partnership - limited liability protection is afforded to members of
LLCs and LLPs.2 9 Therefore, it is the position of the IRS that members of
LLCs and LLPs are subject to § 469(h)(2) and the subsequent restrictions
for demonstrating material participation as a limited partner in a limited
partnership set forth in 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(e)(2).
D. Gregg v. United States: The Beginning of the End for the IRS'
Position That Section 469(h)(2) Applies To Interests Held in
LLCs and LLPs?
Nine years before the United States Tax Court's ruling in Garnett
and the United States Court of Federal Claim's ruling in Thompson, the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon held in Gregg that
the taxpayer's pass-through loss stemming from his interest held in Cadaja,
LLC (Cadaja)30 an Oregon LLC, was an ordinary loss. 3 1
(7) A business entity that is taxable as a corporation under a
provision of the Internal Revenue Code other than section
7701(a)(3).
Id. § 3017701-2(b). Further, under 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3(a), an eligible entity"
[W]ith at least two members can elect to be classified as an
association (and thus a corporation under § 301.7701-2(b)(2))
or a partnership and an eligible entity with a single owner can
elect to be classified as an association or to be disregarded as an
entity separate from its owner.
Id.
With this, taxpayers who wish to create a limited liability company can do so,
and determine their classification for federal tax purposes by simply, "checking-
the-box" they wish: corporation [association] or partnership.
28 Thompson, 87 Fed. Cl. at 728.
29 id.
3o According to the Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Cadaja, LLC was organized under the laws of the State of Oregon on
November 4, 1994. Gregg v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1125 (D. Or.
2000). The plaintiff, along with two other persons, formed Cadaja, LLC for the
purpose "creating a network of credentialized alternative medicine practitioners
and develop management capability for alternative medicine clinics" and plaintiff
was the sole financier. Id. Cadaja, LLC had no formal office until 1995 with the
plaintiff and the other two members of Cadaja, LLC working out of the office of
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In Gregg, the petitioner sued the IRS in the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon seeking a refund of his income taxes paid,
plus interest penalties with respect to the pass-through loss from Cadaja he
used to offset his ordinary income.32 In support of his claim for a refund,
the petitioner asserted that he was a general partner for purposes of federal
income taxation and was therefore, not subject to the limitations on interests
held as limited partner in limited partnerships set forth in § 469(h)(2).
The petitioner grounded his position upon the Oregon Limited Liability Act
(OLLA) and noted that under the Act, a general partner in an LLC was
determined based upon its "control of" rather than its "liability for" the
LLC.34  The petitioner asserted that he should be considered a general
partner for purposes of § 469 since neither the petitioner nor the other two
members of Cadaja were subject to restrictions on their participation or
Ethix Corporation. Id. Further, Cadaja, LLC had no Operating Agreement until
1995; when its name was changed to "Alternare Group, LLC." Id. For the tax
period in question - November 4, 1994 through December 31, 1994 - the
petitioner worked "approximately" 100 hours for Cadaja, LLC for which he
received no compensation and Cadaja, LLC sustained a net loss of $230,723. Id.
31 Gregg, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 1134.
32 Id. at 1124. The IRS disallowed the plaintiff's flow-through loss from Cadaja
in the amount of $230,723 in its Notice of Deficiency issued on March 3, 1998.
Id. The notice set forth the following amounts with respect to the claimed flow-
through loss:
3/3/98 IRS Notice of Deficiency Amount Accuracy-Related
Deficiency Penalty
$91, 366.00 $18, 273. 20
With no action taken by the plaintiff, the IRS made the following assessments on
July 27, 1998 with respect to the plaintiffs $230,723 flow-through loss:
7/27/98 IRS Audit Deficiency Accuracy-Related Interest on
Assessment of Penalty Deficiency
Deficiency
$91,366.00 $18,273.20 $36, 281.76
On August 13, 1998, plaintiff paid the $91,366 audit deficiency and sought a
refund, which the IRS disallowed on January 11, 2000. Id. On August 26, 1999,
plaintiff made a payment of $26,530 towards the accuracy-related penalty and
sought a refund, which the IRS disallowed on November 10, 1999. Id. at 1125-
26.
33 Id. at 1127.
34 Id. (As the district court noted, under Oregon law, "general partner status is
conferred upon a partner who is not subject to restrictions upon participation in
the control of the business").
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control of Cadaja's business under Oregon law or Cadaja's Articles of
Organization and Operating Agreement.35
The IRS counter-argued that the OLLA was pre-empted by §
469(h)(2) and its regulations as promulgated by the Secretary of the United
States Treasury. The IRS then relied upon the language of 26 C.F.R. §
1.469-5T(e)(3)(i)(B) to support its position that the petitioner was a limited
partner for purposes of § 469(h)(2): "[a] partnership interest shall be treated
as a limited partnership interest if. . . [t]he liability of the holder of such
interest for obligations of the partnership is limited, under the law of the
State in which the partnership is organized, to a determinable fixed
amount."37
Since the petitioner and the other two members of Cadaja were
afforded limited liability protection under the OLLA and Cadaja's
Operating Agreement, the IRS alleged the petitioner (1) held a limited
partnership interest in Cadaja (2) he was a limited partner subject to the
limited partnership restriction set forth in Section 469(h)(2) and, (3) he
improperly used the $230,723 in passive losses to offset his ordinary
income.
The district court disagreed with the IRS' position and held that
neither the limited partnership test promulgated in 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-
5T(e)(3)(i)(B) nor, the heightened material participation tests for limited
partners promulgated in 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(e)(2) applied to members of
LLCs. Accordingly, the court ruled that members, like the petitioner, could
demonstrate material participation pursuant to all seven tests set forth in 26
C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1)-(7).3 9
The district court's rejection of the IRS' position was three-fold.
First, the district court noted "a limited partnership must have at least one
general partner who is personally liable for the obligation of the limited
partnership."Ao However, if the IRS' position was adopted and all members
of a LLC were treated as limited partners, and all LLCs were treated as
limited partnerships for federal tax purposes, then they would all be missing
the requirement of having at least "one general partner who is personally
liable for the obligation of the limited partnership.A1
35 Gregg, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 1127-28.
36 id.
3 Id. (emphasis added). For example, the sum of the holder's capital
contribution to the partnership and contractual obligations to make additional
capital contributions to the partnership.
38 Id. Furthermore, the IRS took the even broader position that all members of
LLCs were limited partners for purposes of I.R.C. § 469(h)(2).
39 Id. at 1128-29.
40 Id
41 id
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Second, the district court noted that in a limited partnership a
limited partner cannot participate in the management of the limited
partnership and simultaneously maintain their limited liability protection.42
However, members of a LLC can maintain limited liability protection
irrespective of whether they participate in the management of the limited
liability company.43 Therefore, the district court reasoned, a limited partner
in a limited partnership is not akin to a member of a LLC and thus, the LLC
should not be subject to the limited partnership test contained in 26 C.F.R. §
1.469-5T(e)(3)(i)(B) or the limited partnership restriction of § 469(h)(2)."
Third, the district court noted that Congress' intent in enacting §
469(h)(2) was to prevent the ability of limited partners in limited
partnerships from using passive activity losses to offset their ordinary
income and create tax-shelters because "a limited partner generally is
precluded from participating in the partnership's business if he is to retain
his limited liability status."AS And, as discussed above, because a member
of an LLC is permitted by law and Operating Agreements to participate in
the management of the LLC and maintain their limited liability protection,
Congress most likely did not have members of LLCs in mind when
enacting § 469(h)(2).4
The district court then held that the petitioner should be
characterized as a material participant in the business operations of Cadaja
"if and only if' he satisfied one of the seven tests set forth in 26 C.F.R. §
1.469-5T(a)(1)-(7).4 7 Since his participation in Cadaja only amounted to
100 hours, the petitioner was unable to satisfy 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1).48
42 d
43 Id.
4 Id.
45 id.
46 id
4 7 Id. at 1129.
48 Id. According to 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1): "[t]he taxpayer [must] participate
in the activity for more than 500 hours during such year." Id. The petitioner
asserted this test also sets forth a "quantitative measure" of material participation
based upon the following mathematical computations: "Five hundred hours per
year equates to 9.62 hours per week, or 10.42 hours per week assuming 48 work-
weeks per year." Gregg, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 1129.
The petitioner then asserted he worked 112 hours at Cadaja, LLC for the
eight-week period between November 4, 1994 and December 31, 1994. Id.
Since this equals 14 hours a week and a prorated amount of 728 hours per year,
and 14 hours a week is more than 9.62 and 10.42, and 728 hours is more than
500, the petitioner reasoned he satisfied 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1) on a "pro rata
basis." Id.
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The petitioner was unable to satisfy 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(2) and
(3) because the other two members of Cadaja, according to the Statement of
Facts, each worked 40 hours per week during the eight-week period from
November 4, 1994, to December 31, 1994, which was more than the
petitioner worked during that time period.49
Despite his "aggregate participation in significant participation
activities for such taxable year" exceeding 500 hours, the petitioner was
also unable to satisfy 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(4).s0 The petitioner's
argument under 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(4) that he was a material
participant in Cadaja was based upon his work as a "[flull-time CEO of
Ethix Corporation (Ethix) working at least 40 hours per week on a
continuous basis until he terminated his employment with the corporation in
November of 1994.",51
The district court rejected this assertion for the same two reasons
articulated by the IRS. Id. First, the IRS reasoned the language "if and only if'
contained in 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a) reflected Congress' intent of only allowing
the seven enumerated tests, as they stood, to be the measure of material
participation. Second, the IRS noted that on a pro rata basis, five hundred hours
per year is less than ten hours per week. Id. If the IRS allowed persons to
establish material participation based upon such a "de minimis" standard, the
congressional intent behind I.R.C. § 469(h)(2) would be frustrated: to prevent
persons from acquiring passive-activity interests in a business towards the close
of a taxable year and then using losses from that activity as non-passive losses to
offset their taxable income. Id.
49 Id. at 1130. As the District Court noted, the petitioner did not assert his
material participation in Cadaja, LLC under either of these two tests, which read:
26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(2): The taxpayer's participation in the
activity for the taxable year constitutes substantially all of the
participation in such activity for all individuals, including
individuals who do not own interests in the activity, for such
taxable year.
26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(3): The taxpayer participates in the
activity for more than 100 hours during the taxable year, and the
taxpayer's participation in the activity for the taxable year is not
less than the participation in the activity ofany other individual,
including individuals who do not own interests in the activity, for
such taxable year.
Id. (emphasis added).
'
0 Id. According to 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(4) : "[t]he activity [must be] a
significant participation activity for the taxable year, and the taxpayer's
aggregate participation in significant participation activities for such taxable year
exceeds 500 hours."
51 Gregg, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 1130.
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Since the petitioner's work at Ethix met the definition of
"significant participation" under 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(c)(2) 2 because he
worked more than 500 hours at Ethix in the taxable year of 1994 and, he
also worked approximately 100 hours at Cadaja in the taxable year of 1994,
the petitioner reasoned that his "aggregate participation in all significant
participation activities during such year exceeds 500 hours."53 With that,
the petitioner asserted he was a material participant in Cadaja during the
taxable year of 1994 and his pro rata share of its loss, $230,723, should be
characterized as ordinary, and not passive. 4
The district court agreed with the petitioner that his participation at
Ethix was sufficient to constitute "significant participation" within the
definition of 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(c)(2); however, due to his 500-plus
hours of participation therein, petitioner "erred in mis-characterizing it as a
significant participation activity within the meaning of 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-
5T(c)(ii)."55 The district court reasoned that because he worked at Ethix for
40 hours a week from January of 1994 through November of 1994,
petitioner was a material participant at Ethix under 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-
5T(a)(1): "[t]he individual participates in the activity for more than 500
hours during such year."56 However, the requirement set forth in 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.469-5T(c)(ii) for "significant participation activity" is that the activity
would not be one in which the taxpayer is deemed to be a material
participant "without regard to paragraph (a)(4) of this section."5
Conversely, the district court concluded the petitioner's 100 hours of
participation at Cadaja fell outside the bounds of material participation
under 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(4)."
52 Id. According to 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(c)(2), "significant participation" is
defined as: "[a]n individual is treated as significantly participating in an activity
for a taxable year if and only if the individual participates in the activity for more
than 100 hours during such year."
s3 Gregg, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 1130.
54 id
" Id. In 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(c), "significant participation activity" is defined
as:
a trade or business activity (within the meaning of 26 C.F.R.
1.469-1 T(e)(2)) in which the individual significantly
participates for the taxable year; and (ii) [wiould be an activity
in which the individual does not materially participate for the
taxable year if material participation for such year were
determined without regard to paragraph (a) (4) of this section).
Id. (emphasis added).
56 Gregg, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 1127.
5 Id. at 1131 (emphasis added).
5 8 id
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In the end, petitioner successfully demonstrated his material
participation in Cadaja under 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1) by asserting his
activities at Ethix and Cadaja should be grouped together as a "single
activity" for purposes of 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(5) and (6):
26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(5). The taxpayer materially
participated in the activity for any 5 taxable years, whether
or not consecutive, during the 10 taxable years immediately
preceding the taxable year.
26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(6). The activity is a personal
service activity and the taxpayer materially participated in
the activity for any 3 taxable years, whether or not
consecutive, preceding the taxable year. 9
The district court accepted the petitioner's proposition that even
though Cadaja was formed in 1994-which would have rendered the
petitioner unable to satisfy either the three year or five year requirement of
material participation contained in both 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(5) and
(6)-his material participation in Ethix should be considered in its analysis
of his activities at Cadaja, because of the ability for taxpayers to "group"
activities under 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-4(a) for § 469 purposes.o
59 Id. at 1133. The district court analyzed these two tests together due to the
"common question" of material participation. Id. Accordingly, the analysis was
whether or not the plaintiff materially participated in the activity for any five
taxable years during the ten taxable years immediately preceding the taxable year
of 1994 and whether or not that activity was a personal service activity in which
the plaintiff materially participated for any three taxable years preceding the
taxable year of 1994. Id.
60 Id. Before it could proceed with its "grouping" analysis, the district court had
to reject the IRS' assertion that the petitioner was barred from raising a
"grouping" argument under the "doctrine of variance." Id. The district court
noted that under I.R.C. § 7422(a), a taxpayer "may not raise a claim in a refund
action that was not raised in the administrative process of a claim for refund."
Gregg, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 1133. It was this language that formed the basis of the
IRS' position that because the petitioner did not raise the grouping of his
participation in both Ethix Corporation and Cadaja, LLC until his "Memorandum
in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment," the doctrine of
variance barred the grouping. Id. The district court rejected the IRS' position
and continued on with its analysis of grouping together the plaintiffs activity in
Ethix Corporation and Cadaja, LLC for five reasons. Id.
First, the district court noted that the purpose of the doctrine of variance
"is to prevent surprise and give the IRS adequate notice of the claim and its
underlying facts so that it can make an administrative investigation and
determination regarding the claim." Id. Second, the district court noted that
while the plaintiffs broad Claim of Refund did not, "on its face," call for an
"investigation" by the IRS as to whether or not grouping could occur and could
therefore be barred by the doctrine of variance, the "grouping argument was only
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The district court noted that under 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-4(a),
taxpayers may group together their trade or business activities, including C
corporations subject to § 469, for the purpose of defining "activity" with
respect to § 469 passive activity losses and that "no dispute arose to the fact
that Ethix is a C corporation subject to section 469."6 Therefore, the
district court first had to determine whether or not the petitioner could
attempt to group together his activities at Ethix and Cadaja for Section 469
purposes based upon the type of activity engaged in at Cadaja.
The district court determined this issue in favor of the petitioner
based upon the language contained in 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-4(d)(5)(ii): An
activity that a taxpayer conducts through a C corporation subject to § 469
may be grouped with another activity of the taxpayer, but only for purposes
of determining whether the taxpayer materially or significantly participates
in the other activity.62
The district court's next determination was whether the petitioner's
activities at Cadaj a could be permissibly grouped together with his activities
at Ethix for § 469 purposes. The district court determined this issue in
favor of the petitioner based upon the language contained in 26 C.F.R. §
1.469-4(c)(1) and (2):
(1) One or more trade or business activities . . . may be
treated as a single activity if the activities constitute an
appropriate economic unit for measurement of gain or
losses for purposes of section 469 . . . (2) [e]xcept as
otherwise provided in this section, whether activities
constitute an appropriate economic unit and, therefore, may
be treated as a single activity depends upon all the relevant
facts and circumstances. A taxpayer may use any
reasonable method of applying the relevant facts and
circumstances in grouping activities. The factors listed
below, not all of which are necessary for a taxpayer to treat
more than one activity as a single activity, are given the
greatest weight in determining whether activities constitute
an argument under the material participation claim" and not the Claim of Refund
as a whole. Id. Third, the district court reasoned "[r]equiring that a taxpayer list
all possible arguments for each test under material participation claims was
unreasonable". Id. Fourth, the plaintiff's "grouping" "argument was not
frivolous and was raised in good faith." Id. Fifth, the IRS had adequate notice to
respond to the "grouping" argument because the district court asked each party to
"address whether Ethix Corporation, a C Corporation, and Cadaja, a limited
liability company, can be grouped for the purpose of Treas. Reg. § 1.469." Id.
61 Id. at 1132.
62 id.
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an appropriate economic unit for the measurement of gain
or loss for purposes of section 469. . . (i) [s]imilarities and
differences in types of trade or businesses; (ii) [t]he extent
of common control; (iii) [t]he extent of common
ownership; (iv) [g]eographical location; and (v)
[i]nterdependencies between or among the activities (for
example, the extent to which the activities purchase or sell
goods between or among themselves, involve products or
services that are normally provided together, have the same
customers, have the same employees, or are accounted for
with a single set of books and records.)."6 1
The district court noted that both Ethix Corporation and Cadaja,
LLC had "significant similarities" because they were both "personal service
activities and providing counseling, marketing, networking and business
services to the health care industry."6 The fact that Ethix Corporation was
involved with "traditional medicine" and Cadaja, LLC was involved with
"alternative medicine" was immaterial to the District Court's analysis. 65
Next, the district court noted the petitioner had common control over Ethix
Corporation and Cadaja, LLC because he was the "CEO of Ethix
Corporation . . . and a founding member and managing member of
Cadaja." 6 6 Then, the district court noted Ethix Corporation and Cadaja had
a common ownership connection because the petitioner had a majority
interest in both of them.6 ' Last, the district court noted Ethix and Cadaja
had a common geographic location since both had "their principal places of
business in Portland, Oregon., 68
Since the district court allowed the petitioner to group together his
activities at Ethix and Cadaja as a "single activity" for purposes of 26
C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(5) and (a)(6), the district court held the petitioner was
also permitted to group together his 500-plus hours of participation at Ethix
from January of 1994, to November 4, 1994, with his participation at
Cadaja from November 4, 1994, as a "single activity" for purposes of 26
C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1). The district court then held that because the
petitioner was able to satisfy the material participation test set forth in 26
C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1), his "ratable share of flow-through operating loss
from Cadaja should be characterized as ordinary loss for tax year 1994. "69
63 Id.
6 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 id.
68 Id.
6 9 Id. at 1133. The IRS asserted that despite successfully grouping together his
activities at Ethix Corporation and Cadaja, LLC as a single activity, the petitioner
could not satisfy either the three or five year time requirement set forth in 26
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What is noteworthy about the district court's holding in Gregg is
the decision that the limited partner test contained in 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-
5T(e)(3)(i)(B) did not apply to members of a limited liability company.
However, the district court's holding that the petitioner's losses were
ordinary and not passive was based upon the test set forth in 26 C.F.R. §
1.469-5T(a)(1), which is one of the three material participation tests
available for a taxpayer who is considered to be a limited partner in .a
limited partnership to demonstrate his or her material participation. This
irony put aside, the district court's decision that the limited partner test of
26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(e)(3)(i)(B) was inapplicable to taxpayers with
interests in an LLC, and that such taxpayers should be able to demonstrate
their material participation pursuant to all seven tests set forth in 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.469-5T(a)(1)-(7) would prove to be very persuasive to the Tax Court in
Garnett.
III. TAX COURT AND GARNETT
The petitioners in Garnett held direct and indirect interests in both
LLCs and LLPs that were active in the agribusiness industry.o From 2000
C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(5)-(a)(6) because of the fact that Ethix Corporation was a
"non-pass through C Corporation." Gregg, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 1133. This was
relevant because "[a]ccording to temporary regulations in effect for 1991 and
earlier years, a taxpayer could not be considered materially participating in an
activity in a non-pass-through C Corporation." Id. Thus, the IRS reasoned that
the petitioner could satisfy neither 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(5) nor (a)(6) and was
not a material participant in Cadaja, LLC in the taxable year of 1994. Id. In
response, the district court noted the IRS' argument "had merit", but ultimately
rejected it because of the petitioner's aforementioned ability to demonstrate his
material participation under 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1). Id.
70 Garnett, 132 T.C. No. 19 at 3-4. The Garnett's were living in Nebraska at the
time they filed their petition for a refund. Id. They directly held their interests in
one LLP and one LLC. Id. Through a series of holding LLCs named "Garnett
Family Farms," the Gametts' indirectly held interests in six LLPs and one LLC.
Id. All of the Garnetts' interests were held in LLCs and LLPs that were
organized under the laws of the State of Iowa, pursuant to Iowa Code Ann, §
486A.101. Id.
For chart below, see Chris Wright, Passive Activity Losses and LLC Interests,
TAx LAW REP., July 10, 2009,
http://taxlaw.typepad.com/tax_1aw/2009/07/passive-activity-losses-and-llc-
interests.html.
Business Entity Type of Ownership Percentage of Ownership
Quality Poultry and Eggs Direct Ownership/ LLP 11.11%
Elite Pork Partnership GFF / LLP 11.11%
Center Fresh Egg Farm GFF I/ LLP 12.5%
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to 2002, the petitioners used losses from their LLC and LLP interests to
offset their ordinary income." On their Schedule K-1 for the taxable years
in question, the petitioners identified each holding LLC for the LLPs from
which they were reporting income and expenses, and identified Mr. Garnett
as a "limited partner" in said LLPs.72 The petitioners also identified on
their Schedule K-1 their direct ownership interest in one LLC, and the
holding LLC for another LLC, in which they held an indirect interest and
identified Mr. Garnett as a "limited liability company member" therein.
After a determination by the IRS that the petitioners did not
materially participate in the LLCs and LLPs because their interests were
held as "limited partnership interests" within the meaning of § 469(h)(2),
the IRS Commissioner disallowed their deductions under § 469(a) and
issued a notice of deficiency and assessment of penalties in accordance with
§ 6662(a).7 4
Cedar Valley Egg Farm GFF II/ LLP 10%
Fremont Farms of Iowa GFF III/ LLP 7.5%
Poweshiek County GFF III/ LLP 7.5%
Pullets
Iowa Quality Pullets GFF IV/ LLP 10%
Single Poultry Source GFF IV/ LLC 110.12%
Fremont Farms Direct Ownership/ LLC 16.66%
" Wright, supra note 70.
72 Garnett, 132 T.C. No. at 2. The LLP agreements for the business entities in
which the Garnett's held their interests and in which Mr. Garnett was listed as a
"limited partner," stated that each "partner" would actively participate in the
control, direction and management of the partnership's business and would not
be liable for the debts and obligations of the LLP. Id.
7 Id. The LLC operating agreements stated that a majority of the company's
members would elect a managing member who would have sole authority to act
on behalf of the company. Id. Of the two LLC's that were not holding
companies, Single Source Poultry [indirect interest] and Fremont Farms [direct
interest], Mr. Garnett was not a managing member. Id. However, Mr. Garnett
was a managing member of the holding LLC's GFF I, and GFF II. Id. At the
time of this writing there is no information available as to the managing member
of GFF, GFF III or GFF IV. Id.
74 Garnett, 132 T.C. No. 19 at 1.
Year Deficiency Penalty
2000 $170,268 $34,054
2001 $110,300 $22,060
2002 $80,900 $16,180
The code provision reads: "Imposition of penalty.-If this section applies to any
portion of an underpayment of tax required to be shown on a return, there shall
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In the United States Tax Court, the issue75 presented was whether
or not the petitioners' interests in the LLCs and LLPs were appropriately
considered by the IRS to be held as a limited partnership interests, thereby
rendering them passive per se and subject to § 469(h)(2) and the limitations
for demonstrating material participation under 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1)-
(7) and 1.469-5T(e)(2).
A. The Parties'Positions
In their cross-motion for summary judgment, the IRS' position was
that (1) the petitioner's interests met the definition of a limited partnership
interest under 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(e)(3)(i)(A)-(B), and (2) the
petitioners were not general partners.n The petitioners' position was that §
469(h)(2) was inapplicable to their interests because: (1) none of the
business entities in which they held their interests were a limited
partnership, and (2) they should be considered general partners in their
business entities rather than limited partners.7 8
B. The United States Tax Court Rejects Both Parties 'Positions
The United States Tax Court held the IRS' position was under-
inclusive because in addition to holding a limited partnership interest, a
taxpayer had to also hold his or her limited partnership interest as a limited
be added to the tax an amount equal to 20 percent of the portion of underpayment
to which this section applies." I.R.C. § 6662(a) (West 2010).
75 The issue of the Garnetts' interests in the Garnett Family Farms holding LLCs
was not before the Tax Court: "Respondent states: '[t]hat petitioners mostly held
their interests indirectly (through Garnett Family Farm entities) is of no
consequence."' Garnett, 132 T.C. No. 19 at 13 n.13.
76 See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(e)(3) for the definition of a limited partnership
interest. According to the IRS, "the sole relevant consideration" with respect to
how to characterize the petitioner's interests was whether or not they enjoyed
limited liability protection "with respect to their ownership interests." Garnett,
132 T.C. No. 19 at 5. Since limited liability protection under the state law in
which the partnership is organized is one of the conditions of holding a limited
partnership interest under 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(e)(3)(i)(B), and because the
petitioners had limited liability protection under Iowa law, the IRS asserted the
petitioners interests should therefore be characterized as limited partnership
interests and subject to the limited partner restriction set forth in I.R.C. §
469(h)(2). Id.
n Id.
7 In support of their propositions, the Garnett's relied upon Gregg v. United
States, in which the United States District Court for the District of Oregon held
that I.R.C. § 469(h)(2) did not apply to a member of a limited liability company
registered in the state of Oregon. Garnett, 132 T.C. No. 19 at 14.
440 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW Vol. 5:1
JOURNAL
partner in order to be subject to § 469(h)(2).7 9 However, the United States
Tax Court was unwilling to adopt the petitioners' argument regarding the
definition of a "limited partner" because of certain language contained in
the legislative history regarding § 469(h)(2).so
In a 1986 report regarding the enactment of the TRA, the Senate
indicated the Secretary of the United States Treasury would have the
authority to treat "substantially equivalent entities as limited partnerships
for purposes of § 469(h)(2).""' With this language, the United States Tax
Court reasoned that, "[a]s a corollary, it would appear Congress also
contemplated that some ownership interests in such 'substantially
equivalent entities' might be treated as interests held by limited partners."82
The United States Tax Court then noted that "[a]t first glance" the
definition of a limited partnership interest set forth in 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-
5T(e)(i)(B) "might appear" to treat an interest held in an LLC or LLP as a
"limited partnership interest" since interests held in LLCs and LLPs provide
limited liability protection and limited liability protection is one of the
conditions under the aforementioned Temporary Treasury Regulation of a
limited partnership interest.8 3 Thus, the United States Tax Court held that
in order to decide if the definition of a limited partnership interest set forth
by the Secretary of the United States Treasury in 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-
5T(e)(3)(i)(B) was to be read as treating LLCs and LLPs as "substantially
equivalent" to limited partnerships, and consequently the interests held
therein to be held as limited partnership interests, it was necessary to decide
to what extent the "general partner exception" set forth in 26 C.F.R. §
1.469-5T(e)(3)(ii) applied to LLC and LLP interests.8 The United States
79 Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
80 The petitioners' proposed definition of a limited partner was: a limited partner
is only a limited partner of a business entity that is a limited partnership under
state law and since neither an LLC nor an LLP is "strictly speaking," a limited
partnership, then a member thereof should not be considered a limited partner.
Id. at 16.
81 Garnett, 132 T.C. No. 19 at 20. With this analysis, the United States Tax
Court undercut the Petitioner's proposed definition of a limited partner because if
an LLC and an LLP can considered to be the "substantial equivalent" of a limited
partnership based upon an interpretation of 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(e)(3)(1), then a
business entity would not "strictly speaking" have to be registered under state
law as a limited partnership in order for interests held therein to be considered
interests held as a limited partner. Id. Therefore, the Tax Court was unwilling to
adopt the Petitioner's narrow definition of what constituted a limited partner. Id.
at 19.
82 id.
8 Id. at 22.
84 Id. at 23 n.2 1. According to 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(e)(3)(B)(ii), the "general
partner exception" reads:
Limited partner holding a general partner interest. A partnership
interest of an individual shall not be treated as a limited
2010 Garnett and Thompson: LLC and LLP Losses No Longer 441
Passive Per Se
Tax Court then asserted, "[i]f the general partner exception applies," the
petitioner's ownership interests "shall not be treated as a limited partnership
interest" and the court would not need to define "limited partner" because
the limited partnership restriction set forth in § 469(h)(2) would not apply
to the petitioner's interests.
C. The General Partner Exception
The petitioners asserted that because (1) under Iowa law, they
"were not precluded from actively participating in the operations and
management" of their LLCs and LLPs, and (2) "were given at least some
role to play" in their LLCs and LLPs, they should be considered general
partners therein. While the IRS stipulated to those facts, they nevertheless
asserted the definition of a general partner should be, "one who has
authority, actual or apparent, to act for and bind the copartnership."87 The
IRS proposed this adoption because it would render the petitioners usage of
the term "general partner" insufficient to encompass their involvement in
their LLCs and LLPs since, "[t]he partnership agreements here did not give
petitioners the authority to take action on behalf of the partnerships as a
general partner would (nor did petitioners function like they were general
partners)."
The IRS further asserted that in conjunction with its proposed
definition of a general partner, it was necessary for the United States Tax
Court to inquire "into the nature and extent of petitioners' authority to act
on behalf of the LLPs and the LLCs." 89 Implicit in the IRS' proposition
was that in a § 469(h)(2) case, if such an inquiry revealed that a taxpayer's
level of involvement in, and authority to act on behalf of, his or her LLCs
and LLPs was sufficient to meet the proposed definition of a general
partner, then the general partner exception would apply, and § 469(h)(2)
would not. The United States Tax Court, however, refused to adopt this
partnership interest for the individual's taxable year if the
individual is a general partner in the partnership at all times
during the partnership's taxable year ending with or within the
individual's taxable year (or portion of the partnership's taxable
year during which the individual (directly or indirectly) owns
such limited partnership interest").
85 Garnett, 132 T.C. No. 19 at 22.
86 Id. at 25-26.
87 Id. at 24 (citing Giles v. Vette, 263 U.S. 553, 560 (1924) (The Tax Court
refused to adopt this definition on grounds that "[t]he Court in Giles was less
concerned with the definition of a general partner than with the existence of a
artnership.").
Garnett, 132 T.C. No. 19 at 26.89 Id. at 7.
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proposed inquiry for § 469(h)(2) upon the grounds that such an inquiry
would be "closely akin to factual inquiries appropriately made under the
general tests for material participation" and that "[t]o import them into the
per se rule of section 469(h)(2) . . . would . .. blur that special rule and the
general rules for material participation in a manner that is at odds with the
statutory framework and legislative intent."90
D. Conclusion: The Petitioners Held Their Interests as General
Partners
The United States Tax Court then held that in cases concerning
interests held by taxpayers in LLCs and LLPs, "it is necessary to examine
the facts and circumstances to ascertain the nature and extent of their
participation . . . pursuant to the general tests for material participation
under section 469" and not § 469(h)(2) because "it cannot be presumed"
that those who hold such interests "do not materially participate."91 In
support of this holding, the United States Tax Court noted that:
While limited liability was one characteristic of limited
partners that Congress considered in the enactment of
section 469(h)(2), it clearly was not, as respondent
suggests, the sole or even determinative consideration. To
the contrary, the more direct and germane consideration
was the legislative belief that statutory constraints on a
limited partner's ability to participate in the partnership's
business justified a presumption that a limited partner
generally does not materially participate and made further
factual inquiry into the matter unnecessary.92
The United States Tax Court then noted that the Congressional
rationale quoted above for treating limited partners in a limited partnership
as not being material participants therein does not properly extend "to
interests in LLPs and LLCs" since "members of LLPs and LLCs, unlike
90 Id. To support this belief that a general material participation examination
under I.R.C. § 469(h)(2) cases would be contrary to legislative intent, the United
States Tax Court cited language from a Senate Report stating, "[S]ince a limited
partner generally is precluded from participating in the partnership's business if
he is to retain his limited liability status, the committee believes it should not be
necessary to examine general facts and circumstances regarding material
participation in this context." S. REP. No. 99-313, at 720 (1986) (emphasis
added).
9' Garnett, 132 T.C. No. 19 at 7. The "general material participation tests
pursuant to rule 469" referenced by the United States Tax Court are the seven
aforementioned tests set forth in 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1)-(7).
92 Garnett, 132 T.C. No. 19 at 7 (emphasis added).
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limited partners in State law limited partnerships, are not barred by State
law from materially participating in the entities' business."
With that, the United States Tax Court rendered its ultimate holding
that the petitioners held interests in their LLCs and LLPs as general
partners, and not limited partners, for purposes of § 469.94
IV. UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS AND THOMPSON
The petitioner in Thompson held a ninety-nine percent direct
ownership interest in an LLC organized under the laws of the state of
Texas.95 After an assessment of the petitioner's tax returns for the taxable
years of 2002 and 2003, the IRS disallowed all his claimed losses in 2002
and a portion of those claimed in 2003 and issued a notice of deficiency.9 6
94 Id. at 8. In addition to this holding, the United States Tax Court added, "[i]n
doing so, we recognize that petitioners' status in these entities differs
significantly from the status of general partners in State law limited partnerships,
but we also recognize that their status differs significantly from that of limited
partners in State law limited partnerships." Id.
5 Thompson, 87 Fed. Cl. at 730. The taxpayer organized Mountain Air Charter,
LLC in 2002, in which he held his ninety-nine percent direct ownership interest.
Id. Mountain Air Charter, LLC owned and operated a single airplane and
provided on-demand air transportation services. Id. at 730 n.3. The Taxpayer
held the remaining one percent interest in Mountain Air Charter, LLC indirectly
through JRT Holdings, Inc. Id. at 730. Mountain Air Charter, LLC's Articles of
Organization listed the plaintiff as its only manager. Id. at 731.
Mountain Air Charter, LLC was taxed as a partnership for federal taxation
purposes because the taxpayer did not elect how he wished for it to be classified
and taxed, and Mountain Air, LLC was an "eligible entity." Id. This is known as
the "default" rule, and it is contained in the check-the-box regulations. The
specific provision governing this case, and many other limited liability
companies and limited liability partnerships that do not "check-the-box" and are
therefore treated as a partnership for federal taxation purposes by default because
they are "eligible entities," is: "(b) Classification of eligible entities that do not
file an election - (1) Domestic eligible entities. Except as provided in paragraph
(b)(3) of this section, unless the entity elects otherwise, a domestic eligible entity
is - (i) A partnership if it has two or more members." 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3
(2009).
96 Mountain Air Charter, LLC had losses of $1,225,869 in 2002 and $939,878 in
2003. Thompson, 87 Fed. Cl. at 731. In addition to disallowing the claimed
losses, the IRS issued a notice of deficiency, plus interest, in the amounts of
$437,186 for 2002 and $308,055 for 2003. Id. The petitioner paid the amounts
assessed and sued for a refund on September 9, 2005; the IRS denied the
petitioner's claim on March 2, 2006, and he filed suit in the United States Court
of Federal Claims two weeks later. Id.
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The IRS's position for disallowing the claimed losses was that the
petitioner was not a material participant in his LLC and, under § 469(a),
could not use his passive activity losses to offset his ordinary income.97
The United States Court of Federal Claims held that the sole issue before
the court was whether the IRS correctly treated the petitioner's interest in
his LLC as a "limited partnership interest" under 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-
5T(e)(3)(i)(A)-(B). 9 8
In its motion for summary judgment, the United States asserted that
the IRS was correct in its treatment of the petitioner's losses because the
petitioner's LLC was both taxed as a partnership and he enjoyed limited
liability protection under Texas state law.99 In his motion for summary
judgment, the petitioner asserted that because his LLC was not a limited
partnership under Texas state law, his interest could not be held as that of a
"limited partner." 00 Further, the petitioner asserted that even if his LLC
was a limited partnership, his interest held therein would be more akin to
that of a general partner, not a limited partner, because of the high degree of
control he exercised over management.' 0 '
The United States Court of Federal Claims held that the petitioner
did not hold his interest in his LLC as a limited partner in a limited
partnership and that he should be allowed to demonstrate his material
participation in accordance with tests set forth in 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-
5T(a)(1)-(7). 1o2
The United States Court of Federal Claims first noted that before an
interest could be held as a "limited partnership interest," the plain meaning
97 Thompson, 87 Fed. Cl. at 731. In Thompson, the IRS relied upon the text of 26
C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(e)(3)(i)(B), which treats any interest that enjoys limited
liability protection as a limited partnership interest. Id. Since the petitioner
enjoyed limited liability protection in Mountain Air Charter, LLC in accordance
with Texas law, the IRS argued that his ninety-nine percent interest therein was a
limited partnership interest and was subject to the restrictions set forth in I.R.C. §
469(h)(2). Id. at 733. Further, the IRS's determination was that the petitioner
was unable to demonstrate that he was a material participant in Mountain Air
Charter, LLC under the tests set forth in 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1), (5) or (6).
Id. at 731.
" Id. at 730.
99 Id. at 733.
00 Id.
1o1 Id.
102 Thompson, 87 Fed. Cl. at 739. The United States Court of Federal Claims in
Thompson went on to note that it was not necessary for the petitioner to
demonstrate his material participation in accordance with the tests set forth in 26
C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1)-(7) because the defendant conceded that if it was found
the petitioner did not hold his interest in Mountain Air Charter, LLC as a "limited
partnership interest," then he would be able to demonstrate his material
participation. Id.
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of 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(e)(3)(i)(B) indicated that the interest must be held
in a partnership, which an LLC is not. 103 Next, the United States Court of
Federal Claims noted that the petitioner was not a "limited partner" of a
limited partnership; rather, he was a "member" of an LLC." Finally, the
United States Court of Federal Claims noted that even if the two
aforementioned conditions had not been met, the petitioner would most
likely not hold his interest in his LLC as a limited partner because he would
satisfy the "general partner exception." 05
103 Thompson, 87 Fed. Cl. at 734. The United States Court of Federal Claims
relied upon the Chevron test with respect to interpreting Congressional statutes
and administrative agencies that are charged with enforcement of that statute: if
Congress' intent is clear, meaning it is unambiguous, from the text of the statute,
then courts, as well as said administrative agencies, must defer to Congress'
intent. Id. With respect to the limited partner test set forth in 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-
5T(e)(3)(i), the United States Court of Federal Claims interpreted Congress'
intent, from the plain meaning of the Temp. Reg., to indicate that an interest must
be held in partnership under state law, and not just a business entity that is taxed
as a partnership under federal law, in order for that interest to be considered a
limited partnership interest. Id. Under Texas law, and every other state, a
limited liability company is not a partnership because the latter must distinguish
"general partners" from "limited partners" for material participation and liability
purposes; whereas, a limited liability company does not have to make a
distinction between its members because they can all be material participants and
enjoy limited liability protection. Id. at 733. Thus, under the plain meaning of
26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(e)(3)(i), the plaintiffs ninety-nine percent interest held in
his limited liability company was not a limited partnership interest. The court
also rejected the defendant's position that it, the court, had to defer to an agency
regulation that was set forth in a manner which was reasonable based upon the
applicable statute. Id. at 734 n.7. The court ruled that, once again, Congress'
intent was unambiguous and further, the IRS had never issued a regulation that
expressly stated interests held as members in limited liability companies and
partners in limited liability partnerships were to be treated as limited partnership
interests, that this was just a "convenient litigation" point. Id.
104 Thompson, 87 Fed. Cl. at 734. The court noted this further distinction
because, "[t]he operative condition for applying I.R.C. § 469(h)(2) is not simply
that there be 'an interest in a limited partnership' but an 'interest in a limited
partnership as a limited partner."' Garnett, 132 T.C. No. 19 at 5. As previously
mentioned, the court already held that the plaintiffs limited liability company
was not a limited partnership. Thompson, 87 Fed. Cl. at 734. Thus, its statement
that the plaintiff was a member, and not a limited partner, was even further
supportive of its rejection of the defendant's position that the limited partnership
test of 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(e)(3)(i) applied, since no part of that test could be
seen as applying to the plaintiff as a member of his limited liability company.
105 Thompson, 87 Fed. Cl. at 734. See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(e)(3)(B)(ii),
which provides the definition and explanation of the "general partner exception."
Further, the United States Court of Federal Claims noted that twice, at oral
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V. CONCLUSION
After Garnett and Thompson, taxpayer losses attributable to
interests held in LLCs and LLPs will no longer be considered passive per
se. Since § 469(h)(2) will not automatically'0 6 apply to their losses,
members and partners will now have the benefit of using all seven of the
enumerated tests set forth in 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1)-(7) to demonstrate
their material participation and could potentially be entitled to deduct losses
attributable to their LLC and/or LLP interests from ordinary income
pursuant to § 469(a). 07
argument, the defendant "conceded" that the petitioner would be a "general
partner" if the limited liability company in question was a limited partnership.
Thompson, 87 Fed. Cl. at 735. The United States Court of Federal Claims
referred to the defendant's position as "self-serving" and "contradictory," that it
wanted the court to treat the petitioner's interest in the limited liability company
as a limited partner interest held in a limited partnership under 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-
5T(e)(3)(i), but did not want the court to consider the petitioner's interest in the
limited liability company as a "limited partnership interest" in a limited
partnership for purposes of the "general partner exception" under 26 C.F.R. §
1.469-5T(e)(3)(iii): "[i]f an LLC member could hold a limited partner's interest.
then, alternatively, that same member could hold a general partner's interest . .
." Id.
106 I.R.C. § 469(h)(2) will apply in the event the taxpayer is unable to satisfy any
of the seven tests set forth in 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1)-(7). If taxpayers are
unable to satisfy any of the seven tests, they will be considered passive members
and partners and their losses will be subjected to the restrictions of I.R.C. §
469(a), (h)(2).
107 The test in 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(4), which is not one of the three tests that
may be used by taxpayers to whom I.R.C. § 469(h)(2) applies, is considered to be
the most generous to taxpayers because they must simply demonstrate that they
have spent 500 or more hours participating in all of their significant participation
activities for the taxable year in question.
* 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(c) defines a "significant participation activity" as:
"(i) a trade or business activity (within the meaning of 26 C.F.R. 1.469-
I T(e)(2)) in which the individual significantly participates for the
taxable year; and (ii) [w]ould be an activity in which the individual does
not materially participate for the taxable year if material participation for
such year were determined without regard to paragraph (a)(4) of this
section."
* 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(c)(2) defines "significant participation" as: "[a]n
individual is treated as significantly participating in an activity for a
taxable year if and only if the individual participates in the activity for
more than 100 hours during such year."
* 26 C.F.R. § 1.469.1T(e)(2) defines "trade or business activity" as it is
defined in 26 C.F.R. § l.469-4(b)(1): "[t]rade or business activities are
activities, other than rental activities or activities that are treated under
Sec. 1.469-lT(e)(3)(vi)(B) as incidental to an activity of holding
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A. Hegarty v. Commissioner: The United States Tax Court Uses
Garnett to Justify Taxpayer-Friendly Decision.
One example of taxpayers already benefiting from Garnett and
Thompson and the newfound ability to use all seven tests set forth under 26
C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1)-(7) is Hegarty v. Commissioner.108 In Hegarty,109
property for investment, that-- (i) [i]nvolve the conduct of a trade or
business (within the meaning of section 162); (ii) [a]re conducted in
anticipation of the commencement of a trade or business; or (iii)
[ijnvolve research or experimental expenditures that are deductible
under section 174 (or would be deductible if the taxpayer adopted the
method described in section 174(a))."
'os Hegarty, 2009 Tax Ct. LEXIS 154, at *8. As indicated in the text of the
opinion and pursuant to I.R.C. § 7463(b), the Tax Court's Summary Opinion in
Hegarty "may not be treated as precedent for any other case." Id.
109 Id. at 2-41. The petitioner referred to in Hegarty is the husband, Sean Kieran
Hegarty. Id. On August 1, 2003, petitioner and his wife, Mrs. Kerry Ann
Hegarty, formed Blue Marlin, LLC under the laws of the State of Maryland with
each owning a fifty percent interest in the business. Id. In addition to operating
Blue Marlin, LLC, the petitioner was employed with a mortgage company and
Mrs. Hegarty was a real estate salesperson. The petitioner and Mrs. Hegarty
created the Blue Marlin LLC in order to use their forty-six-foot Post luxury
cruiser for the purpose of chartering fishing excursions. Id. As the Tax Court
indicated, the petitioner and Mrs. Hegarty were the only two persons involved in
operating the business and maintained a written log in which they recorded the
amount of time they spent operating the business. Id. However, when the
petitioner and Mrs. Hegarty moved from Washington D.C. to Florida, the written
log was lost. Id. Nonetheless, the petitioner and Mrs. Hegarty were able to use
business receipts to demonstrate that their participation in operating the business
during 2003 exceeded 100 hours but was less than 500 hours. Id.
The petitioner and Mrs. Hegarty did not choose to treat Blue Marlin
LLC as an entity separate from themselves for federal taxation purposes. Id.
With that treatment, on Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income, the
petitioner and Mrs. Hegarty reported the following for Blue Marlin, LLC in
2003:
Blue Marlin, Income Expenses Net Gain Net Loss
LLC
$9,583 $74,161- N/A ($64,578)
($26,173
attributable to
depreciation
expense)
Id. The $64,578 net loss from Blue Marlin, LLC in 2003 was deducted on the
petitioner and Mrs. Hegarty's 2003 Schedule E, Supplemental Income and Loss,
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the IRS Commissioner disallowed the taxpayer-petitioner's claimed loss on
his Schedule E, Supplemental Income and Loss, stemming from the net loss
of the Blue Marlin, LLC, a Maryland limited liability company. The
Commissioner issued its notice of deficiency on the grounds that during
2003, the petitioner's interest in Blue Marlin, LLC was a passive activity
because the petitioner did "not materially participate in the business" of
Blue Marlin, LLC.o10 The United States Tax Court held that while its
members "would be reluctant" to find that the petitioner "did" materially
participate in the operation of the Blue Marlin, LLC's business in 2003,
such a finding was "not necessary" "for reasons discussed in Garnett v.
and included with their joint 2003 Federal income tax return. Id. On November
21, 2006, the Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency for the petitioner and
Mrs. Hegarty's joint 2003 Federal income tax return in the amount of $23,366.
Id.
110 Hegarty, 2009 Tax Ct. LEXIS 154, at *6. The basis of the Commissioner's
argument rested upon the fact that the Blue Marlin, LLC was operated as a
limited liability company. Id. at 2. Since the petitioner and Mrs. Hegarty's
business was operated as a limited liability company, the Commissioner reasoned
that each of their interests were held as a limited partner in a limited partnership
and, therefore, the petitioner and Mrs. Hegarty were presumably not material
participants in Blue Marlin, LLC in 2003. Id. at 2. With that, the petitioner
would be only be able to overcome that presumption by proving he and Mrs.
Hegarty materially participated in the Blue Marlin, LLC pursuant to 26 C.F.R. §
1.469-5T(e)(2), which provides that only 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1), (5) and (6)
are available for such limited partners and material participation tests. Id. Since
the petitioner and Mrs. Hegarty had only been involved in the operation of the
Blue Marlin, LLC for one year in 2003, 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(5) and (6) were
both inapplicable:
* 26 C.F.R. § 1.4695T(a)(5) - The taxpayer materially participated
in the activity for any 5 taxable years, whether or not
consecutive, during the 10 taxable years immediately preceding
the taxable year. Id
* 26 C.F.R. § 1.469.5T(a)(6) - The activity is a personal service
activity and the taxpayer materially participated in the activity for
any 3 taxable years, whether or not consecutive, preceding the
taxable year. Id.
As a result, the Commissioner reasoned the only remaining test for the petitioner
to use to demonstrate that he and Mrs. Hegarty were material participants in 2003
was: "26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1) - The taxpayer participates in the activity for
more than 500 hours during such year." Id.
Since the petitioner and Mrs. Hegarty only participated in the operating
of the Blue Marlin, LLC for more than 100 hours but less than 500 hours in 2003,
the Commissioner held that the petitioner and Mrs. Hegarty were not material
participants and that the Blue Marlin, LLC was a passive activity from which the
petitioner and Mrs. Hegarty could not use a net loss to offset their ordinary
income. Id.
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Commissioner."'' The Tax Court held that because the petitioner
participated in the operation of Blue Marlin, LLC's business for more than
100 hours in 2003, and this participation "was not less" than the
participation of any other individual with an interest in the Blue Marlin,
LLC during 2003, the petitioner was not subject to the limited partner
restriction of § 469(h)(2).112
B. Section 1402 Self-Employment Taxes: The Potential Negative
Consequence of Garnett and Thompson
Section 1402 of the IRC imposes a tax on self-employment
income.1 3 Included among the items that are subject to self-employment
tax under § 1402(a) is a taxpayer's "[d]istributive share (whether or not
distributed) of income or loss described in section 702 (a)(8)1 4 from any
"' Hegarty, 2009 Tax Ct. LEXIS, at *3. The Tax Court noted that in Garnett, it
held the Commissioner's "reliance upon Section 469(h)(2)" was "misplaced" and
that taxpayers who are involved in the operation of a limited liability company
can demonstrate that they were material participants pursuant to all seven of the
tests enumerated in 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1)-(7), rather than being limited to
only 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(1), (5) and (6) as is indicated in 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-
5T(e)(2). Id.
112 Id. The Tax Court's holding was based upon:
26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(3)- The taxpayer participates in the
activity for more than 100 hours during the taxable year, and the
taxpayer's participation in the activity for the taxable year is not
less than the participation in the activity of any other individual,
including individuals who do not own interests in the activity, for
such taxable year.
Id. at *2. The Tax Court noted that it was "satisfied" that the petitioner and Mrs.
Hegarty had participated in the operation of Blue Marlin, LLC for more than 100
hours during 2003 and was "further satisfied" that the petitioner and Mrs.
Hegarty's participation of more than 100 hours of the operation of Blue Marlin,
LLC was not less than the participation of any other individual. Id.
Of note is the fact that in the Tax Court's "further satisfaction"
explanation, it cited the following: "26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(a)(2). The taxpayer's
participation in the activity for the taxable year constitutes substantially all of the
participation in such activity for all individuals, including individuals who do not
own interests in the activity, for such taxable year." Id.
"' I.R.C. § 1402 (2006).
114 I.R.C. § 702(a)(8) reads: "(a) General Rule. In determining his income tax,
each partner shall take into account separately his distributive share of the
partnership's - (8) taxable income or loss, exclusive of items requiring separate
computation under other paragraphs of this subsection."
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trade or business carried on by a partnership of which he is a
member. .. ." " Further, subsection (a), paragraph (13) of § 1402 reads:
"[t]here shall be excluded the distributive share of any item
of income or loss of a limited partner, as such, other than
guaranteed payments described in section 707 (c)"6 to that
partner for services actually rendered to or on behalf of the
partnership to the extent that those payments are
established to be in the nature of remuneration for those
services." 17
Put together, this means the self-employment tax under § 1402 only
applies to a partner's distributive share of income, and not a limited
partner's share of income, subject to the aforementioned exception with
respect to § 707(c) guaranteed payments. While this may seem inapplicable
to members of LLCs and partners in LLPs, the Garnett and Thompson
decisions may subject them to § 1402 self-employment taxes.
Just like in § 469 and the applicable Treasury Regulations related to
material participation, the term "limited partner" is not defined in §
1402(a)(13).' 18 Nevertheless, taxpayers who argue that they should be
treated as "general partners" rather than "limited partners" for § 469 and
passive activity loss purposes, will have to set forth a seemingly
contradictory argument that they should be considered "limited partners"
and not "general partners" for § 1402 and self-employment tax purposes.119
The United States Tax Court's detailed reasoning in Garnett that members
of LLCs and partners of LLPs are more akin to "general partners" than
"limited partners," combined with the United States Court of Federal
Claim's holding in Thompson that such members and partners are not
subject to the "limited partner" restriction of § 469(h)(2), will make
taxpayers' potential contradictory arguments, for § 469(h)(2) passive
"s I.R.C. § 1402(a).
116 I.R.C. § 707(c) reads:
To the extent determined without regard to the income of the
partnership, payments to a partner for services or the use of
capital shall be considered as made to one who is not a member
of the partnership, but only for the purposes of section 61 (a)
(relating to gross income) and, subject to section 263, for
purposes of section 162 (a) (relating to trade or business
expenses).
"7 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13) (emphasis added).
118 William M. Toomajian et al., Hurdle Lowered for LLC/LLP Members to Avoid
Passive Activity Loss Rules, Aug. 11, 2009, http://www.martindale.com/business-
law/articleBaker-Hostetler-LLP_772000.htm.
1l9Id
2010 Garnett and Thompson: LLC and LLP Losses No Longer 451
Passive Per Se
activity loss purposes and § 1402 self-employment tax purposes, even more
difficult.12 0
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